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Abstract 
Security is increasingly becoming a main concern in Canadian society. Post 
9/11, the challenge for Canada is to strike a balance between maintaining the 
flow of immigration necessary for its demographic and economic 
development and projecting an image of openness at a time when security 
measures are globally being strengthened. In the post-9/11 context, it is 
important to assess the extent to which security concerns have infiltrated 
policy discourse and choices to evaluate whether these concerns are 
changing the overall objectives and goals pursued by the Canadian 
government through policy realms such as immigration. We argue that the 
security logic has become embedded since 9/11. Although security concerns 
were becoming increasingly prevalent through the 1990s, the post-9/11 
period has allowed the security agenda to prevail over the human rights 
agenda and concerns for civil liberties. The emphasis on criminal law to 
address terrorism and the use of immigration policy to impose security 
measures is a step away from upholding goals of social justice, equality, and 
openness that are still central to its policies. The paper addresses these 
concerns and examines options to allow human rights and citizenship rights 
concerns to prevail. 
Résumé 
La sécurité est devenue une préoccupation importante au sein de la société 
canadienne. Après les événements du 11 septembre 2001, le défi auquel font 
face les autorités canadiennes est d'établir un équilibre entre la nécessité de 
maintenir le niveau d'immigration nécessaire pour répondre aux besoins 
démographiques et économiques tout en continuant à projeter une image 
d'ouverture dans un contexte marqué par un renforcement des mesures de 
sécurité. Il importe d'évaluer dans quelle mesure les préoccupations liées à la 
sécurité ont infiltré le discours et les choix politiques et ont modifié les 
objectifs et les buts poursuivis dans le domaine de l'immigration. Nous 
soutenons que la logique sécuritaire s'est implantée dans le discours et les 
pratiques depuis le 11 septembre 2001. Bien que les inquiétudes autour des 
questions liées à la sécurité aient été présentes de manière plus marquée au 
cours des années 1990, la période qui a suivi le 11 septembre 2001 a fait en 
sorte que l'agenda sécuritaire a pris le pas sur les préoccupations liées aux 
droits de la personne et aux libertés civiles. L'accent mis sur le droit criminel 
pour contrer le terrorisme et le recours à la politique d'immigration pour 
imposer des mesures sécuritaires éloigne le Canada des objectifs portant sur 
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des considérations de justice sociale, d'égalité et d'ouverture. Cet article se 
penche sur ces enjeux et identifie les options permettant de recentrer 
l'attention sur les droits de la personne et les droits citoyens. 
Security is increasingly becoming a main concern in Canadian society. In 
his 2001-2002 annual report, delivered to Parliament in 2003, Canada's 
Privacy Commissioner raised profound concerns regarding the protection 
of the private lives of Canadians with the adoption of security measures that 
followed the events of 9/11. The Commissioner stressed that, in the name of 
protection against terrorism, the proposed security measures have 
considerably reduced civil liberties. The measures that caused concern 
included such things as surveillance of all forms of communication, 
monitoring of public places, and the creation of a database of foreign travels 
(Canada, Privacy 2002). In this context, it is not surprising that questions 
linked to the mobility of persons, and more precisely to immigration, have 
come to incorporate in their conception, security measures as they are 
defined by the state. 
Canada's aging population has resulted in a demographic deficit in the 
labour force that successive governments hoped to rectify through an open 
immigration policy. In addition, its international reputation deems Canada 
as a place of choice for many people seeking refugee status. Canada wants 
to continue to project, both to its own citizens and to the world at large, an 
image of openness with respect to immigration. Post-9/11, the challenge for 
Canada is how to maintain the flow of immigration necessary for its 
demographic and economic development, to project an image of openness 
by welcoming individuals whose security is at risk, while taking into 
account the worries of its own population—as well as those of its powerful 
neighbour, the USA—of the real or imaginary dangers represented by 
"strangers" at a time when security measures are being strengthened 
globally. In his 2003-2004 annual report, Canada's Privacy Commissioner 
stated that smart borders are far from an adequate response to the threat of 
terrorism and they make the state spend a colossal amount on tracing 
individual profiles of those engaged in suspicious behaviour (Canada, 
Privacy 2004). In sum, the response to the new security concerns has been 
inefficient and likely an impediment to other policy objectives. 
In the post-9/11 context, it is important to assess* the extent to which 
security concerns have infiltrated policy discourse and choices to evaluate 
whether these concerns are changing the overall objectives and goals 
pursued by the Canadian government through policy realms such as 
immigration. Several authors have pointed out the fact that immigration 
policies are increasingly complex, and sometimes contradictory. They 
mention the irreconcilable goals of such policies: securing labour, reducing 
social costs, maintaining public order, integrating newcomers in the 
appropriate institutions, maintaining national identity, etc. (Castles & 
Davidson 2000; Hollified 2005). Has the Canadian government 
192 
Canadian Immigration Policies: Securing 
a Security Paradigm ? 
fundamentally altered the goals pursued through its immigration policy as a 
result of emerging security concerns in the post-9/11 period, or have the 
immigration policies and measures merely been adjusted to reflect these 
new security concerns without affecting the goals previously advocated? 
Immigration vs. Security 
Three emerging concerns in the post-9/11 context frame the Canadian 
approach to immigration, citizenship, and security: the identification of 
new threats to security; continental integration, i.e. a pull towards greater 
economic integration with the USA, accompanied by pressures for 
harmonization in security, immigration, and border control; and, most 
significantly, when confronted with situations that are seen as potentially 
dangerous, an emphasis on security over human rights and citizenship 
rights. 
Security concerns were not new to states. Indeed, following the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, themujahedeen, who had been encouraged, supported, 
and even trained by the CIA, turned their attention to new targets, including 
their former allies; several American interests and consulates worldwide 
were attacked in the 1990s. More specifically to Canada, both the Smart 
Border Agreement—a bilateral agreement with the United States that was 
signed on December 12, 2001—and the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act (IRPA), the new immigration legislation that obtained royal 
assent on November 1, 2001 but was first presented in the House as Bill 
C-31 on April 6,2000, had been developed much before 9/11 (Abu-Laban 
& Gabriel 2003, 291). The events of 9/11 simply hastened their formal 
adoption.1 Moreover, with respect to border control issues, some consider 
the Ahmed Ressam Affair (the arrest on New Year's Eve 2000 of the 
"MillenniumBomber," an Algerian national who had been living in Canada 
for five years when he was arrested while attempting to enter the US A with a 
trunk full of explosives intended for the Los Angeles airport) as the 
beginning of the politicization of the Canada-US border (Andreas 2005, 
454). From that point on, Canada was often pointed out by US politicians 
and media as having lax immigration policies and soft laws on political 
asylum, hence the politicization of the border issues. 
Following 9/11, governments in Western countries rushed to find new 
ways to address a threat that was now seen as much closer to home than 
before. The fact that the attacks of September 11 took place on American 
soil changed the pre-9/11 perspective. This new context legitimized 
security measures that would have been viewed as intrusive otherwise. 
Public opinion polls taken in 2001 and 2002 repeatedly showed that people 
were willing to give up some freedom in exchange for security (Ipsos-Reid 
2001 ; Adelman 2001,15). We note that this new public mood was, in part, a 
reflection of the way the danger was conceptualized in official circles; a 
perception that was in turn disseminated and popularized by the mass 
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media. The resulting popular mood allowed the fast-track adoption of 
anti-terrorist legislation that gave government access to increased 
surveillance mechanisms. 
Migration controls have become increasingly understood as part of the 
securitization agenda (Bigo 2002,63). As Crépeau and Nakache explain, 
securitization "as a process means that the sphere of internal and external 
security are merging after a period of polarization in which those two areas 
of activity had hardly anything in common" (Crépeau & Nakache 2006,4). 
In this new context, states have come to associate new threats with 
migrants: terrorism, international criminality, and unemployment 
(Crépeau & Nakache 2006). Furthermore, when assessing how the 
anti-terrorism law has been used in Canada, it becomes evident that the 
security agenda has been tagged onto the immigration policy realm. Kent 
Roach, a legal scholar who has closely studied the impact of the 
anti-terrorism law from its development on, has argued that immigration 
laws have been used to respond to the threat of terrorism, rather than the 
provisions set out in criminal law by the adoption of the anti-terrorist law 
(Roach 2003,21 ; Roach 2004,64; Roach 2005). For example, Canada has 
become less accessible to certain categories of refugee claimants through 
the adoption of the Safe Third Country agreement. The Canadian Council 
for Refugees (CCR) estimates at approximately 2500 the number of 
Colombian nationals who did not make a refugee status claim in Canada in 
2005, the first year of implementation of the agreement (Canadian Council 
for Refugees 2005, 8). Moreover, Canadian authorities have used 
immigration laws as a way to detain individuals suspected to be involved in 
terrorist activities. The use of immigration laws is appealing to authorities, 
for it allows for a degree of secrecy and administrative leniency that is not 
standard in criminal law (Roach 2005). Since 2001, five of the six security 
certificates issued (a measure used to detain refugees or permanent 
residents indefinitely without charge on secret evidence) have been against 
individuals of Muslim faith. Several civil rights organizations (e.g. CCR, 
Ligue des droits et libertés, Amnesty International) as well as Arab and 
Muslim organizations (e.g. Canadian Council on American-Islamic 
Relations in Canada* Canadian Muslim Civil Liberties Association, 
Canadian Arab Federation) have denounced the use of security certificates, 
which are perceived as evidence of religious profiling.2 Arevîew of the use 
of security certificates and detentions enacted under the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) demonstrates that "the IRPA provides much 
broader powers to arrest and detain foreigners on security grounds" 
(Crépeau & Nakache 2006, 22). In contrast, the preventive arrest and 
detention measures set out in the Anti-terrorism Act of 2001 have not been 
used and, in February 2007, the Canadian House of Commons voted against 
extending these measures for a longer period of time. In this respect, it has 
been argued that the anti-terrorism laws have been merely symbolic in the 
fight against terrorism (Roach 2003,15), while immigration laws have been 
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used for the practical end of controlling borders and migrants, attempting to 
keep out refiigees and illegal immigrants, who have been perceived as one 
of the new threats in the post-9/11 era. 
A second concern with respect to post-9/11 changes has to do with the 
pressures for continentalization and economic integration. Again, these are 
not new phenomena. We need only think of the Free Trade Agreement 
signed by Canada and the US in 1988 and the North America Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) signed in 1993. These agreements created pressures 
for lifting border controls perceived as barriers to cross-border trade. 
However, post-9/11, the deepening of this integration is accompanied by 
pressures to harmonize policies with the USA for security purposes. As 
Macdonald described it, a new stage of regionalism has been reached in 
North America. Whereas the first phase of integration was one driven by the 
discourse of neo-liberalism and marketized citizenship, the current phase 
"is based on distinctly different assumptions about the respective role of the 
state, citizen, and market" (Macdonald 2005, 9; Adelman 2001, 20). 
Post-9/11, with renewed interests for a common North American security 
perimeter (Abu-Laban & Gabriel 2003, 300), increased securitization of 
regional integration is what is driving the agenda. The overall consequence 
of this state of affairs is to jeopardize Canada's ability to develop its own 
policies in the fields of immigration, military defense, foreign affairs, and 
other areas important to Canada's sovereignty. By attempting to comply 
with demands for harmonization on the security front, Canada is 
compromising its international reputation for peacekeeping, and forrespect 
for human rights and international law. Despite the fact that Canada's 
compliance with the security demands of the US was driven by the 
economic imperative of keeping the border open, its participation as a 
military force in the "war against terrorism," its contribution in the capture 
of prisoners turned over to the Americans and transferred to Guantanamo 
Bay and more recent transfers of prisoners to Afghan security forces, and its 
stricter refugee policy resulting from its compliance to the Safe Third 
Country Agreement, are but a few examples of how security has been used 
to comply with American pressures and how it resulted in a failure to protect 
human rights. 
Finally, the two points made above indicate that, since 9/11, Canada has 
chosen the security agenda over the human rights and citizenship rights 
agenda. Crépeau and Nakache speak of opposing paradigms that need to be 
reconciled: the human rights paradigm that lends itself to being more 
inclusive and serves to protect the rights of citizens and non-citizens alike, 
versus the security paradigm used to exclude people through stricter 
immigration and refugee policies, as well as through border controls. There 
is a need to assess government decisions and policy choices in light of both 
sets of concerns to ensure that security concerns do not become the sole 
determinant of government responses at the turn of the 21st century. 
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Immigration and the Internationalization of Politics: A 
Preoccupation of the 1990s 
Over the course of the 1990s, three processes underlay the politics of 
managing diversity: the implementation of neo-liberal policies, 
centralization, and internationalization. These processes span three 
domains and play a role in structuring and redefining them: immigration 
and asylum policy; citizenship; multiculturalism and Canadian identity 
(Labelle & Salée 1999,125-144; Labelle & Rocher 2006,152-153). 
The main themes of governmental discourse by federal authorities 
reference national and international debates on public policies, partnership, 
security, the flexibility and quality of economic immigrants in the context 
of information and knowledge societies, membership, Canadian identity 
and unity, individual responsibility, and social cohesion (Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada, Permanent Committees of the House of Commons 
and the Senate, Privy Council Office, etc.) (Labelle & Rocher 2006,152). 
In the course of the 1990s, the Canadian state made immigration and 
citizenship a priority. The Immigration Law of 1976 was considered 
obsolete. Issues of national security increasingly became a concern in the 
selection process of immigrants. Although it is post-9/11 that international 
migration came to be reframed as a problem of "national security," in the 
period leading to 2001, immigration was raised from being an issue of low 
politics (demographics, and labour) to one of high politics (international 
relations, security) (Abu-Laban & Gabriel 2003,293). During this period, 
the Canadian state focused on a rigorous selection process, favouring 
individuals able to contribute significantly to the economy (investors, 
entrepreneurs, skilled workers); on gauging the truthfidness of demands for 
political asylum; on assessing the ability of newcomers to adhere to 
Canadian institutions and values; and on the valorization of Canadian 
citizenship (Labelle & Salée 1999,135). 
According to Lisa Maria Jakubowksi, this immigration policy aimed at 
reassuring the population, worried by an increasingly "visible" 
immigration, by the presumed abuse of Canadian generosity by migrants 
from Third World countries, and by the threat that exotic cultural and 
religious expressions could possibly pose to the cohesion of Canadian 
society (Jakubowksi 1997). 
In the course of the 1990s, Canada developed a number of partnerships 
with industrial countries with the objective of limiting "the flux of irregular 
migration." This translated into a harmonization of policies with the United 
States and increased security at airports and at borders (Crépeau 1996,18). 
The documents produced by the federal government focus on punishing 
abuses of the social services of the welfare state, on repressing the 
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internationalization of crime and the trafficking of labour, and on 
welcoming "real" refugees (Canada, Citoyenneté 1994a, 1994b). 
The new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, which came into 
effect in June 2002, replaced the Immigration Act of 1976. In 1996, the 
federal government named a Legislative Review Advisory Group to revise 
the existing legislation. In its 1997 report, it announced the values and 
principles that would serve as a base for immigration and refugee protection 
policies. The group proposed 172 recommendations that touched upon 
almost all aspects of the politics and legislation of immigrant and refugee 
selection (Canada, Immigration 1997). 
The Group's propositions revolve around the following elements: a 
legislative framework that ensures clarity, transparency, and the 
participation of the provincial governments and other responsible key 
players; the reinforcement of the category of family as the cornerstone of 
Canadian immigration, with elements of liberalization and restriction; a 
method of selection of independent immigrants based on the necessary 
qualities for success in a fluctuating labour market, rather than on the basis 
of a specific profession; a program of immigration for business people that 
can contribute to the Canadian economy; a more open policy towards 
temporary foreign workers; the creation of an agency in charge of the 
protection of refugees to Canada and abroad and measures to ensure 
protection and minimize abuse; the application of laws that focus on 
detention to ensure the respect of rules and a system of technological 
control resting upon a system of smart cards for those targeted by the 
measures stated in the law. 
In 1997, the Immigration Legislative Review Advisory Group (the 
Trempe Report) suggested favouring the entrance of individuals able to 
make an immediate contribution to the Canadian economy and the 
enrichment of Canadian culture, the building of favourable conditions for 
immigrants to enjoy full citizenship, the sanctioning of family, and the 
preservation of health and the security of the whole country (Canada, 
Immigration 1997,12). It advocated a more restrictive set of criteria for the 
selection of the economic segment of the Canadian immigration program, a 
larger set of responsibilities for sponsors of immigrants, and greater 
financial autonomy of immigrants. TTie Group also called for a reduction in 
the costs of integration of immigrants (notably the costs tied to learning an 
official language and social assistance). 
These general orientations were revised in 1998 in a document entitled 
Building on a Strong Foundation for the 21st Century: New Directions for 
Immigration and Refugee Policy and Legislation, which proposed new 
directions leading to the formulation of a new Immigration Act The new 
immigration policy aimed at attracting a specialized and mobile population 
to coincide with the needs associated with the technological and economic 
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transformations of Canadian society. It was also designed to undermine the 
soaring numbers of illegal immigrants and limit the trafficking of women 
and children (Canada, Citoyenneté 1998,1-2 & 10-11). Security measures 
aimed at stopping people who could potentially engage in criminal 
activities from coming to Canada; these were not focused on denying 
access to individuals who could be tied to "terrorist" activities, but to 
criminals (Canada Citoyenneté et Immigration 1998,10). 
On 21 February 2001, when Bill C-ll was introduced in the House of 
Commons, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Ms. Elinor 
Caplan, "reaffirm[ed] her commitment to be tough on criminals while 
strengthening efforts to attract skilled immigrants." On the same occasion, 
she specified that the Bill allowed the imposition of severe penalties up to 
one million dollars and life imprisonment for individuals who illegally 
brought people to Canada or who engaged in the trafficking of human 
beings. The Bill also focused on accelerated reunification of families and 
the maintenance of the Canadian humanitarian tradition of welcomeing 
people who need to be protected: "By saying 'No' more quickly to people 
who would abuse our rules, we are able to say 'Yes' more often to the 
immigrants and refugees Canada will need to grow and prosper in the years 
ahead" (Canada, Citizenship 2001). 
These new directions confirm the complementary nature of the political 
and normative objectives of immigration and Canadian citizenship 
(Labelle & Rocher 2006,154). Thus, the document stated that on top of the 
fact that immigration is deeply embedded in national consciousness, its 
nature and function must from now on respond to the need for economic 
prosperity and social cohesion (immigrants are expected to share the values 
of equality and respect for diversity, which form the basis of a vision of 
Canadian society—one based implicitly on the concept of multicultura-
lism) (Canada, Citoyenneté 1998, 9). In this way, the new immigration 
policy would have to put forward the idea of responsible citizenship (an 
equilibrium between rights and responsibilities). The new orientations 
reflected the concerns of Canadian political authorities with respect to 
security (like those of the principal industrialized countries). Several bills 
were introduced in the House of Commons in the period between 1998 and 
2001. Finally, Bill C-ll or the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
(IRPA) was adopted in November 2001. It is worth mentioning that 
although the measures from IRPA came into effect on 28 June 2002, these 
measures were developed before September 2001. 
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration did not fail to mention that 
the IRPA contained measures that are more severe in the case of individuals 
suspected to be a threat to public security. Estibalitz Jimenez and François 
Crépeau outline these stricter controls. They mention strengthened powers 
of detention, the expansion of inadmissibility categories (e.g., security 
concerns, human rights violations, health reasons, etc.), restrictions to the 
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rights of migrants to appeal decisions, tougher penalties for persons who 
break the immigration law, strengthened removal orders, and tougher 
penalties against trafficking regardless of whether humanitarian concerns 
are at play (Jimenez & Crépeau 2002) 
Some of these measures did not go uncriticized. Organizations 
defending refugees denounced the strengthening of the rules and 
mechanisms of protection that would affect their entry into Canada. They 
were particularly shocked by the link established by the Minister between 
asylum seekers and criminality, or threats to national security (Sinha & 
Young 2002, 49.). The legislation was therefore criticized by some for 
being overly insistent on the notion of criminality rather than highlighting 
the welcoming nature of Canada's immigration and refugee programs. 
However, in its entirety, the tone of Bill C-ll and the political rhetoric 
surrounding IRPA stressed the fact that Canada remains a welcoming 
country for immigrants and refugees, and the necessity of maintaining the 
nation's humanitarian tradition. This insistence was instrumental in 
shaping the objectives and character of the immigration policy: enlarging 
the human resources pool (attracting skilled workers and business people) 
and stimulating economic, social, and cultural development (responding 
essentially to the needs of the market). Nevertheless, this tone hid the fact 
that the IRPA privileged security concerns (Canadian protection, border 
control, battles against migrant "threats," and "false" refugees) over 
imperatives linked to the settlement and integration of immigrants 
(Nakache 2003). A relative erosion of the legal protections accorded to 
migrants accompanied the restrictions to immigration brought about by this 
new policy. The erosion of the rights of migrants is not particular to Canada, 
but rather common to all receiving countries. Canada, due to its geogra-
phical isolation, is likely better protected from irregular immigration. 
Moreover, as a result of its Charter of Rights and Freedoms (which imposes 
limits on certain policy choices), it is less likely to enact the harshest control 
measures. Regardless, the more recent international security agenda has 
reinforced pre-existing restrictive tendencies within the Canadian context 
(Crépeau & Nakache 2006,18). 
Among the elements of the new legislation that were well received by 
groups defending the rights of refugees was the provision for a Refugee 
Appeal Division (RAD). The refugee determination procedure was to 
include a quasi-judicial mechanism for appealing negative refugee 
decisions. Since the elaboration of a system of determination of the status of 
refugees in the 1980s, groups that defend the rights of refugees have 
continually criticized the absence of such a mechanism. 
Nevertheless, in spite of obligations imposed on the government in the 
legislation, the RAD was never implemented. In November 2005, during a 
meeting of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration 
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concerning the estimates of refugees admitted to Canada, the Minister 
justifie4 the decision of not having the RAD by highlighting the fair 
character of the system in place. The main objective of the current system is 
to guarantee protection to those in genuine need. Mr. Volpe, at the time 
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration under the Martin Liberal 
government, claimed that the first-level decisions are made by trained 
decision-makers with solid institutional support. Moreover, safeguards are 
built into the system, whereby refugee claimants can bring forward new 
evidence or changes in their circumstances to the attention of the 
Pre-Removal Risk Assessment Officer. Adding an appeals division to the 
system would be inefficient, he claimed. As the Minister explained: 
"Canada's refugee system is by no means perfect. It still takes too long for 
decisions to be made and too long for decisions once they are made to have 
any effect. Simply adding another layer of review or appeal to what we 
already have will do little to address this shortcoming. In fact, it may make it 
worse" (Canada, Citizenship 2005). 
This position is shared by the Harper government. In December 2006, 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada published a series of fact sheets on 
refugee issues. One specifically addresses the question of the Refugee 
Appeal Division. It reiterates that the costs of implementing the RAD 
would be considerable and that the resulting delays in the refugee 
determination process would be greater. Moreover, despite the absence of 
RAD, it is claimed that "the Government of Canada continues to meet its 
international and domestic obligations with respect to refugee protection. 
The system focuses on getting the decision correct at the first level, with 
highly qualified and well-trained decision-makers" (Canada, Citizenship 
2006). Opposition to the missing Refugee Appeal Division continues to be 
heard.3 
The IRPA, while expanding the list of motives that could not be invoked 
to deny a refugee claim, has also allowed the majority of hearings to take 
place in front of a single judge rather than a panel of two judges. This is also 
problematic with respect to ensuring a fair process. Moreover, recent events 
around the nomination of members to the Immigration and Refugee Board 
(IRB) have put into question the legitimacy of the Board. The IRB president 
and the five remaining members of the board that oversaw the nomination 
of members to the IRB (based on a revamped merit system implemented in 
2004) resigned in March 2007 in protest over changes brought about by the 
Harper government. Despite the fact that the 2004-revised appointment 
system was implemented to fix patronage accusations faced by the 
Liberals, in February 2007, the Harper government has announced that the 
Immigration minister would appoint half the members on the advisory 
panel that selects IRB members (Jimenez 2007). The nomination process is 
once more being compromised through renewed politicization of the 
system. The fairness of the refugee determination process must be 
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considered when assessing the primacy of security over human rights 
concerns. Although it is too early to tell what the impacts of the changes to 
the advisory panel will be, this is something that should be included in 
future evaluations. 
Immigration and Security Post-9/11: An Integrated Approach 
Although the immigration and security portfolios are attached to different 
ministries, the problems involved therein are definitely interlinked. More 
specifically, the 9/11 attacks, like the upsurge of incidents aimed at US 
targets abroad, have led many Western states to not only strengthen their 
borders against enemy intrusions, but also to adopt a series of measures 
against the "enemy" hiding within their own walls. Canada is no exception 
to this. After 9/11, many security measures were adopted: the Anti-
Terrorist Bill (C-36) of December 2001; The Smart Border Declaration, 
and its 30-point action plan, signed by Canada and the US on 12 December 
2001; the creation of the Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness 
Canada portfolio (PSEPC) on 12 December 20034; the adoption of a new 
foreign policy called Securing an Open Society, launched in April 20045; 
The Safe Third Country Agreement, an element of The Smart Border 
Agreement that came into effect on 29 December 2004; the Security and 
Prosperity Partnership of North America of 23 March 2005 negotiated 
between the leaders of Canada, the US, and Mexico; and, The Department 
of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Act, that came into effect on 
4 April 2005. 
Several measures had an impact on racialized minorities, refugees, and 
immigrants. A willingness to change how refugees and asylum seekers are 
treated can be noted. For example, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade insisted on the necessity of "[r]eview[ing] 
refugee/asylum practices and procedures to ensure that applicants are 
thoroughly screened for security risks and take necessary steps to share 
information on refugee and asylum claimants" (Canada, DFAIT n/d). Also 
noted was a willingness to establish, conjointly with the US* a database to 
facilitate information sharing on refugee and asylum seekers. 
The Smart Border Action Plan Status Report, dated 17 December 2004, 
highlights the progress achieved on several aspects of the plan. It signalled, 
among other things, the signing of a protocol between Canada and the 
United States that would make the exchange of information related to 
immigration, including information concerning asylum seekers, more 
efficient. This measure should make it easier to identify individuals who 
pose a criminal threat to security or are inclined to criminal activities. 
Moreover, Canada and the US agreed to develop common standards for the 
biometrics. 
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Canada deployed a network of migration integrity officers in 39 key 
countries to combat illegal migration. The work of these oflBcers consists of 
intercepting people intending to enter Canada with false documents before 
their actual arrival. The Smart Border Action Plan Status Report estimated 
that the officers have intercepted 72% of the individuals who tried to access 
Canada illegally, before they arrived in Canada. This amounts to 6000 
individuals (Canada, DFAIT, n/d). It is also important to highlight that the 
government has increased the funds allotted to improving the screening of 
immigrants, refugees, and visitors, in order to reinforce its capacity to 
refuse and/or place under surveillance people who represent a threat to 
Canada. It created the Immigration Intelligence Network (part of the 
Canada Border Services Agency) to better filter out possible suspects 
involved in terrorism. Indeed, border controls, security measures, and 
immigration procedures come together to help the government in the 
selection of genuine refugees. ThcIRPA called forthe strictest penalties and 
new sanctions against clandestine immigration. In addition, in the case of 
10 countries, new demands were placed upon those wishing to obtain a visa 
(Canada, Privy Council 2005,45-48).6 
All these measures, however, did not create a decline in the number of 
applications for Canadian immigration. Canada welcomed more than 
200,000 newcomers each year during the 1990s (with the exception of 1998 
and 1999), as shown in Figures 1 and 2. By the same token, one can note a 
small decline until 2004 between différent categories of immigrants, 
economic immigrants (skilled workers, business people, etc.) always being 
dominant over the other categories. Thus, in 2004, Canada admitted 
235,824 new permanent residents. Among those, 57% were economic 
migrants and their dependents, 26% fell in the family reunification 
category, 14% were refugees and otherprotected persons (including 15,901 
asylum seekers recognized as refugees), and 3% were admitted on 
humanitarian grounds. 
This shows that the flow of immigrants has not diminished post-9/11, and 
the facts tend to show that Canada has remained "open" to it. However, 
since the Safe Third Country agreement between Canada and the US was 
put into effect on December 29,2004, an important decrease in the number 
of demands from asylum seekers can be noted. It has become quasi-im-
possible to demand refugee status at Canadian borders. In fact, the Accord 
requires Canada to return to the US those coming from a third country and 
presenting themselves at the Canadian-American border. To be able to fly 
to Canada, the seekers must obtain a vacation visa from the Canadian 
embassy. Once at the airport, they must show identification before boarding 
the plane. These measures have made it so difficult to claim refugee status 
that the difference in the number of asylum seekers between 
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Figure 1: Total Immigration to Canada, 1962—2004 
Source: Stastics Canada 
Figure 2: Immigration Admissions — New Permanent Residents, 1999-2004 
Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Annual Reports, Various years. 
2001 and 2005 has decreased by 56%, from 44,714 in 2001 to 19,624 in 
2005 (Perreault 2006, A16) . The Canadian Council for Refugees 
denounced this situation in the following terms: 
The Canadian and US governments have stated that the purpose of 
the Agreement is to "enhance the orderly handling of refugee 
claims, strengthen the public confidence of our asylum systems 
and help reduce abuse of refugee programs." In these respects, we 
maintain that the Agreement has failed. The orderly process of 
making claims at the border has been replaced by a disorderly 
situation where people are ill-informed and, when they do have 
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information, often find that saving their lives may mean risking 
their lives—by having to seek recourse to smugglers. We represent 
at least one section of the public that now has a weakened 
confidence in the willingness of the two governments to ensure 
that refugees will find asylum. As for alleged abuse of refugee 
programs, there is no evidence that the Agreement has targeted or 
affected any such problem. (Canadian Council for Refugees 2005, 
31) 
The pull towards bringing Canada's security measures in line with those 
of the US has been driven to a large degree by economic considerations. 
Pressured by the business community to keep the border open, the Canadian 
government feared that the tightening of border controls would hurt trade 
between the two countries, a trade on which the Canadian economy greatly 
depends (Doern 2003a & 2003b; Hale 2003; Whitaker 2003a). In this 
regard, according to government documents, the goals of this policy were to 
ensure "that North America remains the most economically dynamic 
region of the world and a secure home for its people [...]" (Canada Privy 
Council 2005> 50). By the same token, it is said in Canada's International 
Policy Statement that "[s]ince 9/11, the security dimension has received 
more emphasis, leading to unprecedented levels of cooperation between 
Canada, the United States and Mexico on border management, asylum and 
refugee policy, and counter-terrorism efforts" (Canada, DFAIT, 2005, 6). 
Canadian security policy is said not to conflict with fundamental values of 
Canadian politics: democracy, primacy of law, respect for the rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and pluralism. Rather, it aims to keep out the people 
who would "abuse Canadian openness" (Canada, Privy Council 2005,5). 
On the other hand, very little is said in government documents about the 
measures that will guarantee that national security policy will not infringe 
upon the rights and civil liberties of Canadian citizens, immigrants, or 
c refugees. Canadian authorities wanttobèreassuringinhighlightingthefact 
that the state is equipped with mechanisms that would prevent such abuse, 
most notably with die establishment of the Security Intelligence Review 
Committee, which oversees the activities of the RCMP, making sure it 
exercises its power in accordance with the laws and politics of Canada. 
However, the Arar Commission (Commission oflnquiry into the Actions of 
Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar)7 brought to light a different 
reality when it put forward à call to set up a mechanism for examining the 
national security activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The 
objective is to create a new mechanism to track down abuses of power and 
incidents of racial profiling. The findings of the Commission are evidence 
of the state's failure to balance security concerns andhumanrights issues. 
As the Council of the European Union states, terrorism constitutes a 
threat not only to security, but also to the principles of openness and 
tolerance. Macleod and Ricard-Guay concluded that the models of 
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integration (the institutional responses to diversity: multiculturalism and 
the republican [in the French sense] model of integration) in France and 
Great Britain have failed. As they said, in this context, it seems paradoxical 
that governments would proudly announce their willingness to fight against 
racism and exclusion, that they finance action plans in these domains, 
without, however, putting into question security and immigration measures 
that feed anti-immigration sentiments (2006). This comment highlights 
questions that also need to be asked about the Canadian situation. As it was 
pointed out in one of the interviews with a person from CIC, Canada has yet 
to put into question multiculturalism as an integration model. This is 
something soon to come. Similar to the European cases mentioned above, 
Canada has enacted an Action Plan Against Racism without so much as 
recognizing how security measures impact differently certain categories of 
people or how the civil rights of certain groups are more likely to be 
compromised. 
As a result of the prevalent security discourse in North America, Arab 
and Muslim communities have been piut under surveillance. During this 
period, stereotypes were reinforced by American government talk about 
"dormant cells" linked to terrorism, "the axis of evil," and the clash of 
civilizations thesis, inspired by Samuel Huntington (Huntington 1993). 
This thesis claims that the conflicts that will dominate the "global politics" 
of the future will be between cultures and civilizations, that cultural and 
religious differences are not changeable, and that, consequently, cultural 
conflicts are less easy to resolve than political and economic differences 
(Labelle 2006). This discourse propagates the idea of an "internal enemy" 
and lends itself to justifying the need for smart borders to combat terrorism 
and even the need for torture on the basis of a faulty argument. 
The Canadian Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR-CAN), 
relying on a pan-Canadian survey of Muslim communities, has 
documented the prevalence of incidents of religious profiling (2005b). In 
this respect, Canada has reinforced its ties to the US as it defends the 
integrity of its borders. The idea of a smart border has become an integral 
part of these new measures associated with the fight against terrorism. 
Several Arab and Muslim associations have denounced the security 
provisions put in place since 9/11. For example, CAIR-CAN claims that the 
"ATA [Anti-terrorism Act] invigorated security agencies to investigate 
Muslim and Arab citizens" (CAIR-CÀN 2005a, 7). The problems 
associated with the ATA are not limited to abuses of power. As they explain, 
"introducing 'ideology and religion' into discussions of terrorism 
legitimizes intrusive and witch-hunt type questions" (CAIR-CAN 2005a, 
7). This happens as the Canadian authorities continue to deny that racial and 
religious profiling have become more prominent as a result of these security 
measures, particularly profiling that targets Arabs and Muslims. 
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With respect to security, it is possible to think that Canadian policies are 
geared to quickly respond to the pressures coming from the United States. 
For example, after 9/11, the Chrétien government responded to the 
expectations of the Americans and declared that the Canadian military 
would take part in the international coalition, a policy which has also been 
pursued by the Harper government. It also understood, as a result of 
pressures exercised by the business community, that it must put in place 
mechanisms to ensure border safety without impeding the flow of 
merchandise at the border (Whitaker 2003b, 254). In this way, the Canadian 
agenda was not centered on security as much as on fulfilling American 
expectations towards Canada with respect to its role in the international 
coalition against terrorism and its efforts towards border controls 
(Whitaker 2003a). 
All of this indicates that the events of 9/11 brought questions related to 
security and border control to the forefront of public discourse. But these 
questions were already being debated by political authorities in Canada and 
the US. September 2001 thus permitted the acceleration of a process that 
was already in motion. As Reg Whitaker reminds us, there are no doubts 
that the US profited from the incertitude about security, which allowed 
them to reinforce their corrective measures by obtaining the support of a 
large segment of society. A process of readjustment between the 
imperatives linked to security and those related to the protection of civil 
rights has thus taken place (Whitaker 2003b, 252). But if the context in 
which the politics of security had changed, the content of these politics 
remained rather static. In other words, well before 9/11, the issue of border 
control had preoccupied political authorities. In the framework of NAFTA 
or FTAA, the stakes linked to deregulation of borders and the establishment 
ofasecurity perimeter had already been the topicsof discussion (Hale 2003, 
35). 
Critics of the Terrorism Act are not limited to Arab and Muslim groups. 
They come from a variety of actors: the Canadian Bar Association, the 
Canadian Council for Refugees, the Canadian-Arab Federation, the 
Association of Muslim Lawyers, and the Bloc Québécois and New 
Democratic Party, to name only a few (Labelle & Rocher 2006,158). They 
claim that the Act restricts civil liberties, tramples the right to privacy, and 
encourages stigmatization and stereotyping of certain immigrants and 
refugees who are seen as a "threat" to national security. 
According to Abu-Laban and Gabriel, "this has prompted some to 
suggest that public attitudes in the immediate aftermath of disaster are akin 
to the conditions that gave rise to McCarthyism in the US during the 1950s 
and to the internment of Japanese Canadians during World War II" 
(Abu-Laban & Gabriel 2002,476; Abu-Laban 2002). For example, citizens 
of Iraqi origin feared incarceration as "internal enemies" during the war in 
Iraq in 2003. For example in the case of Quebec, to dissipate these fears and 
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address acts of racism and racial intolerance, the former Premier of Québec, 
Bernard Landry, the Council for Intercultural Relations in Quebec, and the 
Minister of Relations with Citizens and Immigration opened a series of 
dialogues between state actors and targeted communities immediately after 
9/11 and during the war in Iraq. This resulted in the adoption of preventive 
measures to counter incidents of racism and xenophobia (Labelle & 
Rocher, 2006). 
Conclusion 
The security logic has become embedded since 9/11. Although security 
concerns were becoming increasingly prevalent through the 1990s, the 
post-9/11 period has allowed the security agenda to prevail over the human 
rights and civil liberties agendas. 
Various circumstances have contributed to upholding the idea of an 
"enemy within." The fact that a number of the perpetrators of the attacks on 
the World Trade Center had been in the US for some time, that the 
individuals arrested for the 7/7 London bombings were British citizens of 
Muslim faith, and that the arrests of the "Toronto 17" (17 individuals of 
Muslim faith arrested in June 2005 on presumption that they would be 
involved in terrorist activities) were all Canadian citizens, gives credence to 
this logic. 
The "enemy within" mentality is used to justify racial profiling and 
increased surveillance by police and by the security apparatus of the state. It 
also justifies stricter refugee policies, closing borders, and violating 
principles set out in international law—illustrated by the role of Canada in 
the Maher Arar case, in handing over Afghan captives for detention in 
Guantanamo Bay and, more recently, to Afghan security forces; in both 
cases violating Canada's obligations under the Geneva Convention to 
safeguard transferred detainees from torture and abuse. These actions 
contradict Canada's reputation of being respectful of international law, 
being a welcoming state, and playing a role in peacekeeping and upholding 
human rights. 
Moreover, because Canada has relied on its immigration policies rather 
than its anti-terrorism law to pursue its security objectives, one can question 
whether the security agenda is being upheld at the expense of human rights 
and civil liberties. It could be argued that the immigration policies have not 
merely been adjusted, but rather that the adoption of a security agenda has 
fundamentally compromised the goals pursued by the Canadian 
government through its immigration policy: economic prosperity and 
social cohesion. 
If Canada still wants to present itself as an open society, then Canada's 
post-9/11 response is problematic. Its emphasis on criminal law to address 
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terrorism and the use of immigration policy to impose security measures is a 
step backwards from upholding the goals of social justice, equality, and 
openness that are still central to its policies. There is a wake-up call to be 
made: Canada will be better off in the long-term if it emphasizes equality 
and openness as objectives rather than favouring security concerns and 
closure (stricter immigration policies). The promotion of equality, 
openness, and anti-racism programs are all part of the solution. When 
security is too often played as a trump card, government and society must be 
reminded that social justice, equality, tolerance, civil liberties, and human 
rights are equally important to ensure the security of Canadians 
(Gross-Stein 2005,72-77). 
What can be done? While it is clear that Canada has been quick to 
respond to US demands for cooperation with respect to border control and 
security matters, Canada need not give in to pressures to harmonize its 
immigration and refugee policies with the US. Canada has always had a 
more open immigration policy; its multiculturalism policy is an indication 
of the government's commitment to facilitate the integration of newcomers 
(Keeble 2005, 366). Those concerned with such matters must remind the 
government of its commitments, spelled out in the Canadian Charter. In 
this respect, a closer analysis of the impact of the Safe Third Country 
Agreement is needed. This analysis should focus not on how successfully 
the agreement has been implemented, but rather on accounting for why the 
faith of individuals is the mechanism by which the door to Canada is closed 
(Canadian Council for Refugees 2006). 
Moreover, it is necessary to stress that emphasis must be put on 
integration of immigrants and anti-racism programs to ensure that there is 
inter-ethnic and inter-community dialogue. The purpose is to not alienate 
newcomers, but rather to ensure the participation of ethnic and racialized 
minorities in all aspects of social and political life, including the 
implementation of Canada's security policy (Keeble, 2005,371 ; Antonius 
2002). This is particularly important if we consider how certain groups may 
be affected differently by such a policy. It requires that Canada stand behind 
initiatives such as the Action Plan Against Racism and expand the work it 
does with communities. 
Finally, when addressing terrorism, Canada must reconsider its 
approach. Its emphasis on combating terrorism through harsher 
punishment and by using the law as a deterrent moves Canada away from 
goals of social justice and respect for human rights to which it clearly 
adheres. This is all more the reason to focus less on a law-and-order agenda, 
but rather to consider security within a human rights framework, one in 
which dialogue between newcomers and citizens is encouraged. 
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Notes 
* This paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science 
Association, York University, Toronto, June 1-3, 2006. It is the result of an 
SSHRC-funded research conducted by the three authors as part of the activities of 
the Centre de recherche sur I 'immigration, l'ethnicité et la citoyenneté (CRIEC) 
at UQAM. It has greatly benefited from the research support of Ann-Marie Field, 
coordinator, CRIEC. We wish to thank the reviewers for their insightful remarks. 
1. This understanding of how policy changes occurred was also confirmed in 
interviews done with public servants from Citizenship and Immigration Canada 
for the purpose of this project. 
2. A recent judgement of the Supreme Court upheld the use of security certificates. 
In Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), the Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of security certificates. However, it held that the use 
of secret evidence had to be reviewed within a one year period. See: http://scc. 
Lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2007/2007scc9/2007scc9.html (consulted March 30, 
2007). 
3. In May 2006, the Bloc Québécois introduced a private member's bill. Bill C-280, 
An Act to Amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, aims to have the 
appeal section set up. In April 2007, it passed the committee stage and is expected 
for third reading in the House of Commons shortly after. If successful, it will be 
sent to the Senate, the last step before receiving Royal Assent. 
4. This ministry replaces the Ministry of the Solicitor General, the Office of Critical 
Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness and the National Crime 
Prevention Centre. As Canada's lead department for public safety, PSEPC works 
with six agencies (Canada Border Services Agency, Canada Firearms Centre, 
Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, Correctional Service Canada, Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police, and National Parole Board) and three review bodies 
(Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP, Office of the 
Correctional Investigator, and RCMP External Committee Review). They are 
united in a single portfolio and report to the same minister (Canada Sécurité 
publique et de la Protection civile 2005). 
5. This policy outlines the key interest of the Canadian government with respect to 
the issue of security. It proposes a framework to allow the government to respond 
to threats to which Canadians could potentially be exposed. The proposed 
measures take into account and even uphold Canadian values: "It does so in a way 
that fully reflects and supports key Canadian values of democracy, human rights, 
respect for the rule of law, and pluralism" (Canada, Privy Council 2004, iii). 
6. The document does not list the ten countries for which these measures apply. 
7. Maher Arar is the Syrian-born Canadian who was detained by the United States 
Immigration and Naturalization Service on a stopover in New York en route from 
Tunis to Montreal in September 2002. Despite his Canadian citizenship, Arar was 
deported to Syria. He was held in solitary confinement in a Syrian prison and 
tortured for almost a year. He was returned to Canada in October 2003. The Arar 
Commission was set up to examine the role played by Canadian authorities in this 
affair. 
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